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	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 20 Feb 2022 14:28:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>TRB 'Cement' Draft Review</title>
		<description><![CDATA[For inclusion in TRB, a feature was proposed, that I intend to comment on in this article.
Sync speed hypothesis
Based on looking at the code, my hypothesis of the expected time the cement sync would take, is: verification time + peer-average transfer time.
By peer-average here, I mean the average determined by all of the uploading peers' [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2022/02/trb-cement-draft-review</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>Pre-TRB Git History</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The Main Point
There was a particular, strange detail in TRB's block and transaction synchronization, to which I found a plausible clue from the pre-TRB commit history. But if I wanted to document this interesting detail, where would I refer to? I don't see much point in referring to some Github or whatever random corporate platforms, [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2021/12/pre-trb-git-history</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>TRB Defect Exhibition - OOM and Other Spam</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Table of contents:

1 TRB std::vector&#8217;s memory footprint

1.1 Other TRB STL containers

2 vRecv burst processing defect

(getdata, getblocks, getheaders, inv, addr, tx)


3 Peer-to-peer protocol state

3.1 High-impact variables

(vNodesDisconnected, mapAlreadyAskedFor, setInventoryKnown, vInventoryToSend)


3.2 Peer addresses
3.3 Lower-impact, amplifying variables

(strSubVer, mapAskFor, vRecv, vSend)


3.4 Peer statistics

(setBanned, setKnown, vTimeOffsets)




4 Spamming debug.log


This is a continuation to the two previous articles (here and here), in a [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2021/12/trb-defect-exhibition-oom-and-other-spam</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>TRB Defect Exhibition - Two DoS Classics</title>
		<description><![CDATA[The denial-of-service classics for TRB presented here are:

the unbounded mempool and
the blockchain checkpoints aging over time, which make it possible to spam a node with bogus blocks, using more and more powerful, but affordable second-hand mining hardware.

I consider them classics, because I can't imagine they weren't widely known already long ago. Why I bothered to [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2021/11/trb-defect-exhibition-two-dos-classics</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>TRB OOM Patch - no_peer_dumpster</title>
		<description><![CDATA[
What follows, should be considered EXPERIMENTAL, because:

I could be wrong,
brain fart this thick is difficult to breathe,
nobody else looked yet, and
it's not been extensively tested.
  

Let us proceed. We will first analyze the current situation, then have a look at the proposed solution.
The reader may first want to have a careful look at the [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2021/08/trb-oom-patch-no_peer_dumpster</link>
			</item>
	<item>
		<title>TRB Homework, Part N: Threads</title>
		<description><![CDATA[I was in a process of writing an explanation for a TRB patch. The changes in question touched TRB's concurrency mechanics, which I thought I had properly already taken into account, but then realized this might've not really been the case. So it was time for some TRB homework: The Threads.
The summary of my study [...]]]></description>
		<link>http://cgra.net/2021/08/trb-homework-part-n-threads</link>
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